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This article looks at the intergenerational issues associated with 
housing in New Zealand. Election year is again upon us (Covid-19 
permitting) and, with the problems surrounding KiwiBuild, 
housing affordability is under the spotlight. It is no secret that New 
Zealand has a housing affordability problem and many causes are 
feeding this. 
Two of these causes – capital taxation inconsistencies and 
infrastructure issues – will be the focus of this article. Inconsistencies 
in the taxation of capital income are a major source of the problem, 
causing intergenerational transfers from younger to older generations. 
A land tax is a possible solution. Complementary policies targeted 
at addressing infrastructure bottlenecks also have an important role 
to play. 
Some causes of high property prices
Capital taxation inconsistencies are an 
important cause of high property prices. 
Andrew Coleman (2018) discusses – with 
specific emphasis on the 1989 changes 
– how the current composition of New 
Zealand’s tax system contributes to the 
predicament we are faced with.
The 1989 tax reforms created conditions 
in which property income became taxed at 
lower rates than income on other assets, 
giving property income a relative tax 
advantage. Owner-occupied housing became 
taxed relatively lightly, and residential 
landlords who borrowed to invest also 
received a significant effective subsidy under 
the new conditions. Meanwhile, even the 
inflation on interest-earning securities 
became taxed, which caused real investment 
income tax on these to be very high. This 
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disjunction caused people to overinvest in 
property, driving up property prices to an 
artificially high level – New Zealand’s 
inflation-adjusted post-1990 property prices 
increased faster than those in other countries 
for which similar data exist – and these 
changes are believed to have contributed to 
that. 
Most theorists agree that, in situations 
where the price elasticity of the demand for 
property is not extremely high, as is the case 
in New Zealand, circumstances in which 
property taxes differ from taxes on income 
from other assets will cause the property 
prices to capture the differences, and this 
appears to have eventuated. While 
homeowners at the time of the changes 
benefited, this created a negative 
intergenerational transfer to non-
homeowners and to all younger generations 
in the form of artificially high property 
prices (Coleman, 2018).
A separate  cause of high property prices 
relates to the fundamental economic 
concepts of supply and demand – the 
supply/demand ratio is too low. Therefore, 
an obvious fix would be to build more 
houses, as KiwiBuild has attempted to do. 
This begs the question, even if we ignore 
KiwiBuild and its failures, why are more 
houses not being built? The main problem 
appears to be the presence of unnecessary 
barriers to development. Evidence from the 
United States suggests that the ability to 
more easily build upwards and outwards 
correlates with more affordable housing and 
vice versa (Darning, 2017). Many factors in 
New Zealand make such expansions far 
from easy, and much of this relates to 
restrictions and perverse incentives facing 
local and regional councils. One such 
perverse incentive relates to infrastructure. 
Infrastructure issues inhibit councils 
from approving developments. The relative 
power and influence of central government 
on public policy is very high in New 
Zealand. Apart from rates, councils do not 
have any significant sources of income. To 
adequately maintain and create the 
infrastructure needed for development, 
councils would need to increase rates or 
cut spending on other local projects, or 
both. None of those options would be 
politically popular. Even just maintaining 
existing infrastructure is already proving 
difficult (Krupp, 2015). 
Based on these factors alone, councils 
are hardly going to be proactive in 
supporting development. There are, of 
course, other influences at play as well. One 
of these is the Resource Management Act, 
widely considered to be a central issue 
restricting housing development; another 
is‘not in my back yard’ (NIMBY) opposition 
to residential development. 
A land tax solution
Even just highlighting two of the many 
causes of high property prices indicates 
that change is necessary. Just as there are 
many causes, there are also many different 
options that can be used to address the 
issue. One option that may be more viable 
than others (if implemented correctly) is 
a centrally levied land tax; this can help 
counter both of the aforementioned causes.
First, a land tax can be used to tax 
residential property, which, it has been 
argued, is relatively lightly taxed. In New 
Zealand’s housing market, where the price 
elasticity of the supply of housing is low, 
this would reduce the relative tax advantage 
of residential property over other capital 
assets (Coleman, 2018). Therefore, the 
extent to which property is over-invested 
in, driving prices up to artificially high 
levels, would also be reduced.
In addition, if it is implemented 
correctly, increased tax revenue that stems 
from the land tax can help reduce property 
prices. Putting the extra tax revenue into 
infrastructure investment could offset the 
extent to which infrastructure is currently 
underinvested in. Because housing 
developments need this critical 
infrastructure, councils – despite still facing 
other incentive issues – will be more 
inclined to approve developments that they 
may not otherwise have approved, making 
it easier to build (Crampton and Acharya, 
2015). As a consequence, the supply of 
housing would increase, resulting in 
enhanced housing affordability. 
The benefits
While other policy options for addressing 
this issue are available, a land tax has 
many benefits. A capital gains tax is one 
option that has often been proposed, 
but this has been rejected by the current, 
Labour-led government, partly due to its 
political unpopularity (Bowker, 2019). 
Meanwhile, flat-rate property taxes can 
behave similarly to capital gains taxes 
in this context (Coleman, 2018). Rosen 
(1982) highlights more generally, in an 
overseas context, how these property taxes 
can be effective. With land tax working in 
effectively the same way, it is a potentially 
more palatable substitute for a capital 
gains tax. 
Younger cohorts would likely support 
a land tax for the same reasons that many 
take out student loans: while they would 
pay more in the future, it would be better 
to benefit from reduced property prices 
now, to put them in a more stable position 
where they are more able to pay in the 
future. A land tax is also a win in both 
equity and efficiency terms. Land is a form 
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of wealth and the burden of the tax tends 
to fall mostly on landowners, making it 
equitable (Coleman, 2018). While many 
equity gains come at the expense of 
efficiency, land is fixed and exists whether 
it is taxed or not, making the price elasticity 
of supply inelastic. This minimises the 
deadweight cost, making it efficient, too. 
These factors are likely to make a land tax 
relatively popular. 
The issues
Despite the potential relative popularity 
of this option, there will be issues and 
objections. Property owners stand to lose 
from land taxes (ibid.). That land taxes are 
more appealing than alternatives will not 
stop people opposing change altogether in 
order to retain high property prices. 
People who became property owners 
post-1989 could get the double negative of 
buying at an artificially high price and then 
having to pay land taxes and would want 
to avoid this. Pre-1989 owners who still 
own that property would also want to 
retain the intergenerational transfer that 
has benefited them – a classic example of 
different cohorts’ interests clashing and 
providing a friction that slows or stops 
policy change even if it may produce a net 
benefit. 
Self-interest will lead to inevitable 
opposition, which is quite likely to carry 
political influence, especially when 
supporting emotive arguments are 
available. The prospect of grandma losing 
her family home because of being unable 
to pay these taxes is something that 
opponents of such taxes would be stupid 
to ignore. 
In addition, the current tax terms of 
reference rule out land tax on owner-
occupied housing. Retaining this prohibition 
would create distortions and undermine the 
effectiveness of the policy (ibid.). 
Overcoming the issues: intergenerational 
design considerations
The extent to which these issues would 
affect a land tax being introduced would 
determine what design and implementation 
measures would need to be taken to give 
effect to it. The simplest case is that it 
would be sufficiently supported on its 
own merits, in which case the best course 
of action would be to merely remove 
the part of the terms of reference that 
prevents owner-occupied housing being 
included. Regardless of other measures, 
this removal would be necessary to ensure 
the effectiveness of the land tax. However, 
given that political considerations are a 
major issue with land taxes, matters may 
be more complicated (ibid.). 
While specific issues, such as elderly 
people not being able to afford to keep their 
family home, could be solved by products 
such as reverse mortgages, this is unlikely 
to satisfy opponents. If opposition from 
homeowners would otherwise preclude 
land taxes from occurring, consideration 
of how to win them over is necessary for 
the sake of younger generations, and 
intergenerational policy can be utilised for 
this purpose. While easier said than done, 
the blackboard ideal would be to strike the 
right balance by which you give just enough 
to potential opposition to reduce their 
fightback such that political sustainability 
can be achieved.
In terms of designing intergenerational 
policy, there are many options that could 
be developed that would have different pros 
and cons. One option is a cohort-based 
policy that would simply exempt from the 
tax (until the owners’ deaths or for a stated 
number of years) pre-possessed property 
owned by people born prior to a certain 
year (at the time of the change 
announcement). As older people tend to 
have higher home-ownership rates, this 
would likely reduce the opposition to such 
changes from these exempted people, 
which might be enough to get the required 
political support. 
Restricting the exemption to pre-
possessed property also restricts loopholes 
such as people getting their parents to 
purchase property on their behalf. A 
downside of such a policy is that this 
further favours people who have likely 
already had intergenerational benefits in 
the form of gaining from the 1989 tax 
changes at younger cohorts’ expense. It 
would also slow the effect of the change to 
a more gradual pace. Yet, if compromise 
needs to be made to enable change, such 
options are worth exploring. 
This is just one of many potential 
interventions that could be explored. The 
purpose of such explorations is not to 
definitively convince people that any specific 
idea is a good one. Any idea would need to 
be assessed in terms of what specific figures, 
ages or time frames (or any other desired 
measures) would be appropriate to maximise 
the effectiveness of the land tax policy, and 
ideas would need to be compared based on 
the resulting information.
The purpose of this example, rather, is 
to highlight that there are options for 
engaging in constructive intergenerational 
conversations about public policy. Such 
conversations could help reduce 
intergenerational tensions that could 
otherwise prevent the development of 
enduring beneficial policies. It is also to 
give an indication of some of the necessary 
considerations. 
Some may still point out the tendency 
for arbitrariness in deciding age, cohort or 
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generational cut-offs in designing 
intergenerational policy; people in similar 
circumstances may well face different 
obligations or exemptions. Yet, as evidenced 
by the highlighted downsides in the above 
example, this may be a necessary cost of 
introducing and sustaining a policy that is 
expected to produce a net societal benefit. 
It is a rare policy that leaves everybody 
winning and nobody losing. 
Conclusion
It is clear that New Zealand faces a large 
housing issue, one that is intergenerational 
in cause and can also be intergenerational in 
solution. Capital taxation inconsistencies, 
caused by the 1989 tax changes that 
created an intergenerational transfer from 
younger to older generations, along with 
infrastructure issues have contributed 
significantly to the house price problem 
and land taxes are a potential option to 
address this issue. Yet land taxes do not 
come without their perceived deficiencies. 
Nevertheless, the contribution of such 
interventions to intergenerational equity, 
despite not being ideal, may help overcome 
some of these objections, towards restoring 
house prices to more affordable levels. 
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Reforming capital income 
taxation to improve housing 
affordability
New Zealand’s distortionary tax environment for housing imposes large 
costs on young people. Since 1989, New Zealand has taxed owner-occupied 
housing more lightly than other forms of capital income. In contrast, 
retirement savings have been taxed heavily. This combination has created 
a bias towards owner-occupied housing, encouraging homeowners to live 
in higher quality properties than they would under a neutral tax system, 
and bid up the price of land located near desirable amenities. 
While existing, often older homeowners have enjoyed high land and 
house values, our generation has faced artificially inflated house prices. 
Distortionary capital income taxation has contributed to New Zealand’s 
housing affordability crisis. 
Forms of capital income taxation
Capital income can be taxed on three bases: 
exempt-exempt-tax (EET), tax-exempt-
exempt (TEE) (both expenditure taxes), 
and tax-tax-exempt (TTE) (an income 
tax). Most OECD countries adopt an EET 
scheme for retirement savings. Under this 
scheme, income is not taxed when it is 
earned or accumulating in a retirement 
savings fund, but instead taxed when the 
balance is withdrawn at retirement. 
Owner-occupied housing in New 
Zealand is taxed on a TEE basis. This means 
income used to purchase a house is taxed 
when it is earned, but imputed rent and 
capital gains are not taxed. New Zealand 
taxes retirement savings in KiwiSaver, 
rental properties, shares and other assets 
on a TTE basis. This means income is taxed 
